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We in the law schools (to borrow a phrase from Karl
Llewellyn) are living through the "second explosion" ofin­
terest and activity in the empirical study oflegal institutions
and processes. It cannot fairly be said that the philanthropic
foundations have supplied the spark for the detonation; but
they certainly have provided a lot of the power. Explo­
sions, if uncontrolled, can be destructive. But it is not my
purpose, in this briefnote, to inquire into the myriad prob­
lems that have followed in the wake of recently launched
programs of institutional research. Rather, for the purposes
at hand, I shall assume that these difficulties can and will be
resolved, that project research will be domesticated with
reasonable success, and that programs of other-than-doc­
trinal inquiry will become accepted as a normal and impor­
tant part of the institutional functions ofmany law schools.
I shall, on these assumptions, confine myself to the consider­
ation of one small, but perhaps neglected, aspect of the
broad question: How can the utility of such research be
most fully realized?
It would certainly be a gross error to assert that, in the
movement toward empirical studies oflegal institutions, no
significant thought has been given to the role of historical
research. If one turns to the Summary of Studies in Legal
Education, issued by the Columbia law faculty in 1928
(which occupies a place somewhere near the center of the
"first explosion"), he will discover frequent references to
historical studies, in connection with both curriculum mat­
ters and research. Indeed, one of the objectives, stated in the
Summary is "to lay the basis for more serious study oflegal
history than has hitherto been contemplated in this coun­
try." Everyone knows that highly important historical
scholarship was inspired by the Columbia studies and by
thought of similar orientation elsewhere. And yet, conced­
ing all this, it is probably fair to say that the movement to­
ward empirical research in the law has not been strongly
characterized by consistent interest and concern with his­
torical studies. Those attracted to non-doctrinal inquiry
have, in general, felt a stronger affinity with the sociologist,
the economist, and the psychologist than with the historian
and his discipline. The truth is that some of those who, in
the last generation, struck the match to the "first explo­
sion" were not only uninterested in, but were inclined to
doubt the value of, historical studies, both in and out of the
law. And this unconcern, if not hostility, is probably char­
acteristic of a good many who have become active in the
contemporary phase of the movement.
It is not hard to advance partial explanations for this situ­
ation. One reason undoubtedly lies in the character ofmuch
historical research in the closing years of the last century.
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History has been written in response to a variety ofmotiva­
tions and to serve a variety of purposes. Certainly, many of
"the Historical School" often employed history as an in­
strument oflegal conservatism. It was not entirely without
reason that some who pioneered in the application of em­
pirical technique to the study of legal processes recognized
in the legal historian their natural enemy. Perhaps more fun-
.damentally, it is a matter of temperament. An urge to dis­
turb the dusts of the past and a desire to apply empirical
technique to contemporary issues are not always found in
the same person, and rarely in anything approaching the
same degree of intensity.
Nevertheless, it seems to me that historical studies have a
role to play in the current movement toward empirical in­
quiry and that this role has not always been adequately ap­
preciated. In making this observation, I am not simply
viewing with alarm the current state of scholarship in
American legal history. Of course, the field is and has been
neglected; but a reasonable amount of very good work is
being done, and there are favorable auguries for healthy
development in the future. Nor should I be understood as
saying that the study oflegal history can be justified only by
its contributions to empirical inquiry into contemporary
problems. No doubt, history, like Emerson's Rhodora, pro­
vides its own excuse for being. It may be essential to the
"humane study of the law," as Boorstin would have it. And
it has contributions to make to doctrinal, as well as other
sorts of, scholarly endeavor.
But it is the relations between historical and "fact" re­
search that I wish to assay. Presumably, the general object of
systematic examination of legal institutions and legal proc­
esses is to derive understanding. But most research in the
law contemplates that such understanding shall be put to
use, and this use may often be the intelligentmodification of
existing institutions, processes, and doctrine. It is my con­
tention that, in many instances, the attainment of these ob­
jectives is assisted and advanced by competent historical in­
quiry and that, clearly, the construction ofany general the­
ory of institutions is not possible without very considerable
research into extensive historical sequences, along with
much else.
In considering some of the reasons for this, I should per­
haps begin with a truism. Most would agree that, ordi­
narily, intelligent fundamental modification of institutional
arrangements requires the grasp of some useful general no­
tions of institutional behavior and a great deal of under­
standing ofwhat the particular institution is and does. And
understanding ofwhat any particular institution is requires
knowledge ofhow it has become what it is. Perhaps most of
what I shall say is really summarized in this formulation:
But the statement is too general to be either very meaning­
ful or persuasive.
Second, history expands the range of basic data relevant
to the understanding and solution of contemporary prob­
lems. This is true both with reference to the ordinary func­
tions and functioning of institutions and with reference to
the effects of various measures impinging on the operation
of institutions and processes. This proliferation of data pro­
vides a stimulus to the imagination when making provision
for the problems of the future. It may, for example, permit
the legislative draftsman to avoid "forgetting something"
vital when he undertakes to order or influence the future.
Third, history frequently throws light on what will and
what will not work. It frequently suggests something of the
price that must be paid in countervailing values. Can it be
doubted that a really competent modern account of that
great (if not noble) experiment, Prohibition, would have
much of value to teach as to contemporary problems of
social policy and the mechanisms of social control within
the legal order? And should one doubt the significance of
the element of recurrence in historical development, let him
compare the problems of the Thames waterfront in the
closing years of the eighteenth century, as described by
Radzinowicz in the second volume of his evolving history
of English criminal law, with the conditions of the New
York waterfront in the 1940'S and 1950'S.
Fourth, historical research (to state an apparent paradox)
is often required to overthrow the dead hand of tradition.
To express the thought differently, history needs writing to
correct false notions of history and the social consequences
of such notions. No matter is of greater importance to the
law reformer, or any other apostle of change, than the cur­
rently accepted historical image of the institution, arrange­
ment, or process which he seeks to alter. This is true whether
he be concerned with the jury, the privilege against self­
incrimination, the elected judiciary, or the use of the seal in
real estate transactions. As Morris Cohen well said, inertia is
the first law of social change, as it is of physics. In the social
arena the sanctification ofexisting institutions is the mecha­
nism of inertia. No claim need be made that the competent
writing of history will often, by its own force, guarantee
the achievement of that which is needful. But it can and
should be asserted that historical research may clear the
ground for, and render more nearly possible, the rational
and intelligent discussion of what is required to be done.
Nor is it the point that historical research is only an instru­
ment of change. For, as Julius Goebel has properly observed,
it has lessons to teach as to what are the essentials of the
tradition worth preserving as well as to what may sensibly)
be abandoned or altered.
Fifth, history serves to keep alive insights and proposals
of the past which tend to be lost in oblivion. This is a wast­
age of intellectual assets we can ill afford. The lack of con­
tinuity relating the work of one investigator to that of an­
other, and the loss thereby occasioned, has frequently been
noted in the social disciplines, including non-doctrinal work
in the law. I suggest this discontinuity also separates the
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work of the generations. That the problem is real may be
illustrated by a trivial example. Who has not experienced
the shock of discovering (sometimes by accident) that his
"new" idea was being discussed in the law reviews twenty­
five or thirty years ago? Again, an interesting contrast is
provided by the continuing influence of the Benthamite re­
formers in England and the comparative absence of influ­
ence, in this country, of such innovators as Livingston. I
suspect that a complete explanation would take into account
the differences in the character and extent of historical en­
deavor in the two countries.
Sixth, history works economy in another sense. Any ma­
jor proposal for law reform is likely to involve some pre­
liminary historical investigation, however unsystematic,
simply because it is obviously indispensable. Such efforts are
usually inadequate because of the labors involved in collect­
ing relevant, but widely scattered, materials. Competent
histories which collect and systematize the source materials
ease these labors and go far to insure consideration of the
proposal on a broader base of information and 'insight.
The foregoing observations, of course, do not in any
sense exhaust the subject. There is an obverse side to this
discussion. For the insights and techniques derived from
empirical studies of current problems may often be of the
greatest utility in historical research. Indeed, in many areas
they have contributed wholly new conceptions ofwhat is
relevant and meaningful for historical study. Thus, the
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Kinsey studies, for all their methodological vagaries, and
despite the sheer perversity and wrongheadedness that un­
doubtedly characterize the work, produced insights which
are genuine and of continuing value. No subsequent studies
of the history and development of American family rela­
tions or the regulation ofsexual conduct will be able wholly
to avoid taking them into account. Two generations of in­
vestigation into the relations ofeconomic interest to politi­
cal theory and thirty years of speculation as to the psycho­
logical underpinnings of judicial behavior have eliminated
at least the excuse for production ofa biography like Bever­
idge's magnificent and magnificently naive Life ofMarshall.
Moreover, "fact" research in its descriptive aspects often
provides a base line from which subsequent change and
modification may one day be measured by the future his­
torian with a degree ofaccuracy never attainable heretofore.
Indeed, the state crime surveys of the twenties and thirties
and the Wickersham Report of the same period, for all their
disappointing limitations, are already, in some measure,
serving this function in the area ofcriminal law administra­
tion. One may hope and expect that the function will be
served more adequately by the current Survey of the Amer­
ican Bar Foundation.
But allow me to return to my original thesis. The sys­
tematic study of things legal from other than a predomi­
nantly doctrinal orientation is in its infancy. Maturity is yet
to be won. In making this effort, we shall be wise not to
overlook the contributions which historical study can
supply.
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